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How we think about need or deprivation-how we judge its sever-
ity, its causes and effects, and the progress we have made (or not
made) over time in reducing it-has much to do with how we define
and then measure it. And, we measure it poorly. The insufficiencies
of official data on American poverty are reasonably well known, yet
they continue, nonetheless, to be the principal means by which we
gauge need in the United States. After a review of such official mea-
sures, this article discusses alternative means of evaluating need in
the United States, highlighting the benefits of examining poverty
across the life-course, and attending to inequality and other indica-
tors of a relative poverty; it then discusses the advantages of turn-
ing toward human rights- and human development-based frame-
works for better defining and quantifying deprivation. It concludes
with a brief review of the political obstacles to such policy reform.
Key words: deprivation, need, poverty, measures, human develop-
ment, policy
Official Poverty
There may be no measure so universally acknowledged
to be inadequate-and so resistant to change-as the of-
ficial measure of American poverty. According to the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, a family of three
was poor in 2005 if its annual income was below $16,090; it was
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not poor if it had income above that. For a single person, the
number was $9,570; for a family of five, $22,610. So, by official
Census Bureau measures, which use that threshold, 37 million
Americans were poor in that year, 12.6 percent of the popula-
tion-the equivalent of the combined populations of California,
Alaska and Wyoming (U.S. Census Bureau; Glasmeier, 2006).
The official rates were substantially higher among African-
Americans (1 in 4 was poor that year), Hispanics (1 in 5), and
children under eighteen (nearly 1 in 5). Those over age 65, by
contrast, had a poverty rate of just over 10 percent. Rates vary
by geography, too: fully one-third of all Detroit residents were
poor, as were a quarter or more of people living in Philadelphia,
Buffalo, Milwaukee, Long Beach, Atlanta, Newark, Miami,
and El Paso. According to the Community Service Society of
New York, in 2005 "the number of poor people in the five bor-
oughs would form the fifth-largest city in the United States"
(Levitan, 2006): At the time of the hurricane that devastated
the American gulf coast in that same year, almost 40 percent
of all New Orleans children lived in poverty; throughout the
states of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama, over 40 percent
of black children lived in poor families (National Center for
Children in Poverty, 2005). While these data might still have
some power to shock the conscience, they nonetheless likely
underestimate the problem.
The method of calculating this "poverty line" has re-
mained largely unchanged since it was devised in the 1960s by
the Social Security Administration's Molly Orshansky. Even
then she warned that her calculation was a "research tool" that
would inevitably minimize poverty, and that it was "not de-
signed to be applied directly to an individual family with a
specific problem" (Katz, 1989, p. 116). That's nonetheless how
we use it now. She took the Department of Agriculture's esti-
mate for the cost of an emergency survival-level food budget,
adjusted it for family size, and multiplied it by three, since it
was then estimated that food represented one third of a fam-
ily's total expenses. That's the poverty line. Critics of the left
and right find legitimate fault with this method. The former
argue that it understates the problem of poverty: its design pre-
sumed a minimal budget only practicable for short-term emer-
gencies, yet it now forms the basis for evaluating longer-term
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well-being; food now typically represents much less of a fam-
ily's budget (with housing costs often 40 percent or more; in
some locales transportation alone can be 20 percent of house-
hold expenditures) [Center for Neighborhood Technology,
2005]; it doesn't take into account unavoidable out-of-pocket
expenditures (especially for medical care) that can make it im-
possible for a family to provide for basic needs even if their
income is above the official threshold; and the index doesn't
vary by region, so the poverty line is the same dollar amount
in San Francisco as it is for rural Mississippi, despite large dif-
ferences in their relative costs of living. Other critics, by con-
trast, argue that the measure overstates the extent of American
poverty, notably because income calculations do not include
the value of "in-kind" government benefits like Medicaid,
housing subsidies, or food stamps.
One in a series of alternative official measures developed
by the Census Bureau (from studies done by the National
Academy of Sciences), adds in most in-kind benefits and the
Earned Income Tax Credit and deducts expenses for health care
and payroll taxes: this had the effect of raising the 1999 poverty
rate by 3.2 percentage points, and similar alternatives add an
average of about two percentage points to the official calcula-
tion each year from 1999-2003 (Mishel, Bernstein, & Boushey,
2003, p. 323; U.S. Census Bureau, 2005, p. 12). Given just how
poorly the official thresholds capture what is required to ad-
equately support a household, many public aid programs use
cut-offs of between 125-200 percent of poverty to determine eli-
gibility; indeed, one effort to create a typology of four hundred
separate family budgets found that the median family need in
the U.S. was about twice the official poverty rate (Boushey et
al., 2002; Lu et al., 2003).
Yet even these alternatives fail to account for how poor
poor Americans are; in 2004, while almost 13 percent were offi-
cially poor, 5.4 percent were very poor, with income at or below
one-half the poverty line. By 2005, deep poverty had reached a
32-year high (Pugh, 2007). And, as with any absolute measure
with an essentially arbitrary cut-off, official poverty lines
cannot account for the fact that families just above the line may
experience the same hardships as those just below, but a binary
poor/not-poor definition identifies one as a social and political
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problem (and captures it in the data), but excludes the other.
Official data will not get us far in evaluating or understand-
ing the lived experience of poor Americans, or of adequately
gauging their numbers.
Poverty over the Life-Course
There is another problem with poverty data, which also
serves to obscure the extent of poverty in America. Official
rates are "snapshots": they seek to count how many people
are poor at any one point in time. But Americans move in and.
out of poverty over the course of their lives-the line between
working class, working poor, and poor can be very thin indeed.
Many families are poor one year, not poor (at least officially so)
the next, and then poor again the following year. One harsh
winter, fire or natural disaster, epidemic or illness (cholera,
smallpox and yellow fever swept through the ghettoes in the
past; today poor households face AIDS, diabetes, asthma, tu-
berculosis, or gun violence), divorce, the death or incarceration
of the main breadwinner, an injury or disability, or the sudden
loss of a job-these can push a family from just getting by into
dire crisis (McKeman and Ratcliffe, 2002).
Thus, it would seem productive to ask how many American
are ever poor, and perhaps to factor that into our thinking
about the scale and scope of the poverty problem and the
urgency with which it should be addressed. For many years
now, Mark Robert Rank and Thomas A. Hirschl have sought
to do just this, and their research findings strike at the heart
of the claim that poverty is a state confined to a minority of
Americans (Rank, 2004; Rank & Hirschl, 1999, 2001a, 2001b).
They find that between the ages of twenty and seventy-five,
58.5 percent of Americans will be officially poor at least once,
with income at or below 100 percent of the Orshansky poverty
line. The numbers are even more striking if we take seriously
the extent to which the official line understates poverty, as dis-
cussed above: some 68 percent of Americans will survive at
some point on 125 percent of the official standard, and fully
three-quarters of American adults will have incomes below 150
percent of the poverty line at least once. Worse, by age seventy-
five, almost one-third will be very poor, with incomes at only
Failures of American Poverty Measures
half the official poverty line. And, lest we conclude that these
are isolated incidents of one-time hardship (or data distorted
by the "voluntary" poverty of college students), of those adults
over twenty who are poor at least once, for some 30 percent it
is for five years or more. This is not some measure of a very
brief episode these data magnify beyond reason. For a major-
ity, it's an event, and for nearly a third, a durable condition.
Still we misdiagnose the problem, for these are data about
the entire population, and it is worse for particular groups of
Americans. As Rank and Hirschl also show, by the time they
reach age seventy-five, over 90 percent of African Americans
can expect to have experienced poverty. If you are black and
female, expect to be among the 98.8 percent of your peers who
will be poor at least once. For people with less than a high
school education, the lifetime poverty-incidence rate is over 75
percent, and we can expect one-third of all American children
to live in poverty at some point. If they are black, the number
is 69.5 percent (compared to 25.9 percent for white children). If
they are raised by a single mother with less than a high school
diploma, 99.4 percent will be poor. And while we make much
(and rightly so) of the advances that Social Security has brought
us, between the ages of sixty and ninety, over 40 percent of
Americans will nonetheless be poor at least once.
When we move away from point-in-time analyses and
examine the incidence of poverty throughout the life spans of
Americans, a much larger problem emerges, for we see that
Americans move in and out of poverty more frequently than
official data can reveal. Hardships are part of our national ex-
perience, and poverty is not the exception, but the rule; no
anomaly confined to some marginal and marginalized popula-
tion, poverty in America is endemic.
Relative Poverty and Inequality
Some will insist, however, that poverty isn't what it used to
be. For instance, according to Robert Rector and his colleagues
at the Heritage Foundation, by the late 1990s, 41 percent of all
households who were officially poor nonetheless owned their
own homes, almost 70 percent owned a car or a truck (and
27 percent owned two or more), 60 percent had a washing
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machine, 48 percent had a clothes dryer, 66 percent had air
conditioning, almost all had a refrigerator, 87 percent had a
telephone, and more than half had a stereo, color television,
VCR, or microwave. For these reasons, and more, "we have tri-
umphed over poverty," they claim (Rector, Johnson & Youssef,
1999).
There's much that we might find wrong with the implica-
tion and this method of argumentation, however. First, people
do not compare themselves to their ancestors, but to their neigh-
bors. To suggest that because poor families today have televi-
sions and microwaves they are therefore less poor than their
nineteenth century cousins is a nonsensical comparison. And
as Timothy Smeeding (2005) notes, "lower-income Americans
are no better off and often worse off than low-income persons
in other nations." That is, looking not to the past, but to other
nations in the present, living standards for many are better
elsewhere. Second, few of these indicators shed light on the
quality of life of the family under investigation-owning a
car, for example, is now a necessity in most parts of America if
one is to work (a lesson that poor and welfare-reliant families
have tried to tell policymakers over and again, as their ability
to hold down a job is hampered by transportation expenses
and car problems). Moreover, having a car is at best a double-
edged sword, for with it comes a monthly payment, mandated
insurance expenses and licensing fees, the cost of gasoline, and
maintenance expenses. Does commuting in a car indicate a
better quality of life than taking a streetcar to the factory, or
walking to the mill? Similarly, homeownership should not be
read as meaning too much, since it too can be as much burden
as opportunity, and we should be careful about what we mean
by ownership-for most Americans what we really mean is that
they possess not a home but an enormous mortgage, which, if
paid regularly for three decades, will result in ownership. It's
an important distinction if we are going to suggest that home
ownership rates should be used to suggest that poverty today
is of a different kind than in the past, and a claim rendered
even more problematic by the recent crises in the residential
mortgage market.
Nonetheless, it seems accurate to suggest that the nature
of material poverty has changed, and, even while perhaps
Failures of American Poverty Measures
disagreeing, it is not hard to understand how the Heritage
Foundation could elsewhere say that:
To the average man on the street, to say someone is poor
implies that he is malnourished, poorly clothed, and
lives in filthy, dilapidated and overcrowded housing.
In reality there is little material poverty in the U.S. in
the sense generally understood by the public. (Albelda,
Folbre, & CPE, 1996, p. 12)
In the 1300s, to take a most extreme contrast, up to one
third of the population of Western Europe was killed by
plague, while well into the 1500s and beyond most all people
lived in constant fear of hunger (Geremek, 1994). We face many
grave public health threats today-gun violence and explod-
ing AIDS caseloads in low-income communities being perhaps
the most dramatic-but nowhere near a third of our popula-
tion will die of sudden disease. It can serve as one reminder of
how far we have, in fact, progressed. More recently, in Colonial
Philadelphia, perhaps 25 percent of all free men (whom one
would presume to be the richest of residents) were what we
might call poor or near poor. Jacob Riis reported that in late
nineteenth century New York, "in a population of a million
and a half, very nearly, if not quite, half a million persons were
driven, or chose, to beg for food." By 1900, fully 40 percent of
all Americans were still poor, and even by 1950 the American
poverty rate was likely 30 percent. Only very recently has
any sustained reduction below this level occurred in official
measures. By the mid-fifties, U.S. poverty had declined to 25
percent; the rate was at 17 percent in 1965, and by the early
1970s, hit 11 percent. While that rate has now climbed again,
and still understates the problem, the official estimate is none-
theless some 300 percent lower than its equivalent at the begin-
ning of the century (Trattner, 1994; Riis, 1890; Patterson, 1994;
Jansson, 2001; Jencks, 1992).
One might plausibly argue that never before in human
history has so much real progress been made, and made so
quickly. Compared to feudal societies, early industrial econ-
omies, or even America at the beginning of the last century,
we no longer have widespread incidence of abject poverty in
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the U.S., as the Heritage Foundation claims. But we don't live
in a feudal or early industrial era, of course, nor do we live
at the turn of the century. We live here, now. While histori-
cal comparisons of official poverty rates may reveal general
trends (though they may not, given the historical variation
in methods used to count poor persons), such measures are,
at best, of limited practical use if our goal is to evaluate the
degree of want that faces Americans. And again it does not
"reckon with the tendency of men to compare themselves with
their contemporaries rather than their ancestors," in the words
of historian Robert Bremner (1956, p. 13).
Moreover, living standards may be subject to what Richard
Layard (2005) calls the "hedonic treadmill." As he puts it, it's
"like alcohol or drugs. Once you have a certain experience,
you need to keep on having more of it if you want to sustain
your happiness." People adapt and adjust to their surround-
ings and to their living standards, and we know that people
feel a loss more acutely than an equivalent gain (Kahneman
& Tversky, 1979). As Amartya Sen observes, "in a generally
opulent society, more income is needed to buy enough com-
modities to achieve the same social functioning" (Sen, 1999, p.
89).
This is why many seek definitions of poverty that move
beyond mere brute calculations of money income. One rela-
tive measure, and the one often used in international compari-
sons of poverty, sets the line at half the median income. By this
way of counting, poverty in the U.S. was 17 percent in 2000
(almost 6 percentage points higher than the official measure,
or some 16 million more people who would be counted as
poor) [Luxembourg Income Study, 2000]. For much of its life,
the Orshansky measure actually equaled about one-half the
median income; but it is about one-third now, and if current
trends continue it will soon be one-fourth median income-
yet another indication that our official measure does not fully
capture the extent of poverty in the U.S. (Glennerster, 2002).
Any relative measure requires us to think differently about
need, and to understand human deprivation within a social
context. Such efforts have a long pedigree. For example, the
1986 National Conference of Catholic Bishops' report Economic
Justice for All defined poverty not in terms of absolute money
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income but as the "denial of full participation in the economic,
social and political life of society and an inability to influence
decisions that affect one's life" (in Katz, 1989, p. 180). Economist
John Kenneth Galbraith (1958, p. 323) wrote similarly:
People are poverty-stricken when their income, even
if adequate for survival, falls markedly behind that
of the community. Then they cannot have what the
larger community regards as the minimum necessary
for decency, and they cannot wholly escape, therefore,
the judgment of the larger community that they are
indecent. They are degraded for, in the literal sense,
they live outside the grades or categories which the
community regards as acceptable.
Dwight MacDonald (1963), in a New Yorker review of
Galbraith's The Affluent Society and Michael Harrington's
seminal The Other America, said it more succinctly: "Not to be
able to afford a movie or a glass of beer is a kind of starvation
-if everybody else can." Even Adam Smith (1776) concedes
the utility of such an approach: "Every man is rich or poor
according to the degree to which he can afford to enjoy the
necessaries, conveniences, and amusements of human life."
He elaborates later in Wealth of Nations:
By necessaries I understand, not only the commodities
which are indispensably necessary for the support of
life, but whatever the custom of the country renders
it indecent for creditable people, even of the lowest
order to be without. A linen shirt is, strictly speaking,
not a necessary of life. The Greeks and Romans lived, I
suppose, very comfortably, though they had no linen.
But in the present times, through the greater part of
Europe, a creditable day-labourer would be ashamed
to appear in public without a linen shirt, the want of
which would be supposed to denote that disgraceful
degree of poverty, which, it is presumed, no body can
well fall into without extreme bad conduct. (quoted in
Sen, 1999, p. 73)
Smith won't go as far as MacDonald, and explicitly ex-
cluded beer, ale, and wine from the list, since "Nature does
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not render them necessary for the support of life, and custom
nowhere renders it indecent to live without them," but he did
have a notion of poverty that would make him something of a
wild-eyed radical today, given the value he placed upon "the
ability to appear in public without shame."
Such ideas of a relative poverty-a poverty defined by
one's relation to others and one's freedom to act as others
do-are not widely accepted in the United States today. That
is to say, we don't apply middle-class standards of living to
poor people on relief, and don't expect our relief programs to
attempt the kind of egalitarianism of status or social function-
ing suggested in the poverty definitions just highlighted, even
Adam Smith's. Quite the opposite-most Americans relief
programs are designed and implemented to provide minimal
benefits to as few as possible, thereby abiding by English Poor
Law standards of "less-eligibility" (Piven and Cloward, 1987;
Somers and Block, 2005).
Yet poor Americans nonetheless aspire to more than mere
subsistence, and in a culture in which advertising businesses
earn some $63 billion in annual revenue, it is perhaps not ratio-
nal to expect those messages to inspire non-poor households
to purchase goods they don't strictly need and simultaneous-
ly expect poor people to resist those same enticements (U.S.
Census Bureau, 2004). One may well enter dangerous terri-
tory by presuming to know what constitutes "necessities" for
a poor black woman in New York if you are a rich white man
in Washington, D.C., and vice versa, for that matter. Poverty
can't be assigned an absolute measure, for what we think of as
poverty not only varies over time, it is relative among people at
any point in time. As has been said of power, perhaps poverty
is a relationship, not a thing unto itself.
Thus, if poverty is best thought of as a relative measure, it
is inevitable that if some have great wealth while many have
little or none, those with little will perceive themselves to be
more poor than they would if everyone were in the same boat:
in this way, inequality exacerbates poverty. And income in-
equality is higher in the United States than in any other ad-
vanced nation, and has been increasing for the past forty years,
after a brief period in the mid-twentieth century when it was in
decline (Smeeding, 2005). While official poverty has declined
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over the past forty years (from 17.3 percent in 1965 to 12.6
percent in 2005), inequality is worse, of late at levels not seen
since the Gilded Age or on the eve of the Great Depression.
From 1947 to 1973, incomes of all Americans rose, with those of
the poorest rising the most, but since 1973 income gains have
been concentrated among the top wage-earners, with incomes
stagnant or declining for the rest (Smeeding, 2005). This has
not been lost on the public-a late 2004 poll by the Maxwell
School at Syracuse University (2005) found that more than
two-thirds of those surveyed agreed that "we are becoming
a society of the haves and have-nots" and half thought that
government should do more to reduce inequality. Less than
one-third thought that "everyone in American society has an
opportunity to succeed."
The causes of growing inequality are likely complex
and varied-some combination of the declining value of
the minimum wage, falling rates of unionization, regressive
changes to tax policy, the declining real value of welfare and
other public benefit programs, the effects of international trade
and immigration, and changes in the labor market wrought
by deindustrialization (Lenz, 2003; Page & Simmons, 2000).
The effects of inequality are pernicious: as British sociologist
T. H. Marshall asked, "how can equality of citizenship coexist
with capitalism, a system based on social class inequality?" (in
Quadagno, 1987). One recent study of 129 countries found that
inequality even increases corruption (the use of public power
used for private gain). It both legitimizes it and makes it easier
to achieve; and that corruption, in turn, exacerbates inequality.
This dynamic is especially true in democratic societies-and
makes clear that without economic equality, political equality
is in jeopardy (Yoo & Khagram, 2005). Similarly, as economists
Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis write:
Economic inequality-particularly when overlaid
with racial, ethnic, language, and other differences-
increases social distance, which in turn undermines the
motivational basis for reaching out to those in need.
Indeed, surveys consistently reveal that the support for
those in need is stronger in societies whose before-tax
and -transfer incomes are more equal. (Bowles & Gintis
1988/1999; see also Uslaner & Brown, 2003)
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The American Political Science Association convened a
Task Force on Inequality and American Democracy in the fall
of 2002. Their report, published in December of 2004, was gen-
erally a measured, cautious affair, yet they concluded:
We find disturbing inequalities in the political voice
expressed through elections and other avenues of
participation. We find that our governing institutions
are much more responsive to the privileged than to other
Americans. And we find that the policies fashioned by
our government today may be doing less than celebrated
programs of the past to promote equal opportunity and
participation. Indeed, trends in all three areas-citizen
voice, government decision making, and public policy
-may together be amplifying the influence of the few
and promoting government unresponsiveness to the
values and needs of the many. (APSA, 2004)
In short, inequality matters, and may itself exacerbate con-
ditions that limit policy changes that could ameliorate poverty.
Attending to both, poverty and inequality can be justified not
merely on humanitarian or moral grounds, but as a necessary
means toward maintaining a democratic polity. Just as by fo-
cusing on point-in-time analyses we have underestimated the
extent of American poverty, by failing to pay attention to the
causes and consequences of inequality or of relative poverty
measures, we have understated the dangers posed to the
health of the republic itself. Poverty and inequality are matters
of concern for a majority, not a minority, of Americans, some-
thing else that is obscured by our reliance upon official poverty
measures.
Poverty, Freedom, and Independence
Traditional poverty measures are blunt instruments, gen-
eralized efforts to define and quantify the abstraction that
we call poverty. To take seriously, by contrast, a "bottom-up"
approach to poverty analysis (Schram, 1995; Pimpare, 2007,
2008), that is, to shift analysis away from mere poverty policy
to an examination of the varied, lived experience of those
who are poor and otherwise marginalized, we might attend
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to economist Amartya Sen's (2000) re-definition of poverty as
lack of freedom, or capability deprivation. Freedom here is the
"capacity of people to live the kinds of lives they value-and
have reason to value." To shift our thinking about what consti-
tutes poverty in this manner would focus our attention upon
how well Americans have managed to survive and thrive, and
how that has differed for different groups, in different places,
at various times throughout our history. For Sen:
Development requires the removal of major sources of
unfreedom: poverty as well as tyranny, poor economic
opportunities as well as systematic social deprivation,
neglect of public facilities as well as intolerance or
overactivity of repressive states. (p. 3)
Thus, the United Nation's Millennium Development goals
include reducing poverty and hunger, as we might expect, but
also encompass 48 distinct criteria focused upon such things as
child and maternal health, combating disease (especially HIV/
AIDS), environmental sustainability, improving education (es-
pecially for women), and forging ties between rich and poor
nations, all within a larger commitment to expanding civil and
political liberty (U.N. Millennium Development Goals, 2008).
Poverty matters, but is insufficient alone if we truly seek to
improve people's freedom in the way Sen understands it. One
way in which the World Bank has thought of this is through
the ostensibly simple move from "ill-being" to "well-being,"
or from what they identify as powerlessness, bad social rela-
tions, insecurity, material poverty, and physical weakness to
freedom of choice and action, good social relations, security,
having resources enough for a good life, and physical well-
being (Narayan et al., 1999, Figure 1). This reveals one means
by which relative poverty measures seek to expand the evalu-
ation of an individual's well-being to much broader effect, ac-
knowledging that poverty must be judged by how one person's
or family's circumstances relates to the well-being of others,
and by how well any person or family fares according to their
reasonable aspirations.
Similarly, the U.S. Agency for International Development
and the Population Reference Bureau have evaluated the well-
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being of women throughout the world not only in terms of
wealth or income, but along such dimensions as women's
lifetime birth rates; their access to and use of contraception;
the share of all births attended by trained medical personnel;
maternal deaths per 100,000 live births; AIDS/HIV, literacy,
and school enrollment rates; the percentage of women in the
labor force; their percentage in national legislatures; and more
(BRIDGE, 2008). These, too, give us a richer sense of capa-
bilities, of freedom, than mere poverty data can. Or, looking
just at the United States, Heather Boushey and her colleagues
(2002) broaden the traditional poverty measure by evaluating
instances of critical hardships (missing meals, eviction, discon-
nected utilities, or not receiving essential medical care) and
serious hardships (lack of child care, worries about access to
food and stable shelter, missing utility payments, disconnected
phone).
The Annie E. Casey Foundation (2008) has tracked chil-
dren's well-being since 1990 for all 50 American states along
75 measures, and created an index comprised of 10 key indi-
cators: infant mortality, low birth rate, child death rate, teen
death rate, teen birth rate, high school drop-out rate, parents'
employment, number in two-parent households, number not
in school, number employed or in the military, and the child
poverty rate. Similar national-level efforts have been under-
taken by the Federal Interagency Forum on Child and Family
Statistics (since 1997) and the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services (since 1996), among others, all in the belief
that aggregate measures of poverty, whether absolute or rela-
tive, convey too little information (Lippman, 2005). Whether
these more complicated approaches enable us make sense of
the world is another matter. The Federal Interagency Forum's
2005 report, for example, showed that since its previous report,
the child population was up, births to unmarried women were
up, child poverty was up, food security was down, incidenc-
es of overweight were up, immunizations were up, low birth
weight and infant mortality were both up, but child mortality
was down, as were births to adolescents, and drug use was
down, while the number of young people who were victims or
perpetrators of violence were both up (Child Stats, 2008). But,
of course, the goal is to create richer measures of well-being,
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not simpler ones.
American organizations are also turning to the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights to make evaluations about well-
being in the United States. The National Economic and Social
Rights Initiative goes so far as to identify an American "Human
Rights Crisis":
Civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights
have all been attacked and undermined in the courts,
legislatures, workplaces and the streets. Economic and
social rights in particular are virtually unrecognized in
the U.S. The United States faces: the highest rate of child
poverty among industrialized nations, over 45 million
people without health insurance, over 36 million
people suffering food insecurity, a shortfall of 5 million
affordable housing units and 14% of households with
critical housing needs, 20% of the population being
functionally illiterate, the longest working hours in the
industrialized world, and working families that cannot
afford basic needs such as housing and health care.
(National Economic & Social Rights Initiative, 4)
It's not traditionally the way in which we think about
poverty (FDR's failed Economic Bill of Rights notwithstand-
ing), but this broader look at citizens' well-being may be a
more useful way to judge the effectiveness of the welfare
state. Other organizations throughout the United States have
adopted international human rights claims in order to try to
change policy, whether it's advocating for increased funding
for and easier access to food stamps by citing Article 25 of the
Universal Declaration (everyone has the right to a standard of
living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his
family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care), or by
seeking reform of domestic violence and child custody laws
in the language of both the Universal Declaration (no one shall
be subject to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment) or
the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child (which re-
quires that governments protect the child from all forms of physi-
cal or mental violence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent treat-
ment). Others use similar frameworks to focus on the rights
of immigrants and indigenous peoples, gender and race-based
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discrimination, environmental justice issues, or the rights of
workers or prisoners (Massoud, 2006; Neubeck, 2006; New
York City Welfare Reform and Human Rights Documentation
Project, 2000; Wellesley Centers for Women, 2002; Ford
Foundation, 2004; Williams, 2006, Chs. 1-3).
Such multi-faceted efforts to evaluate the needs and rights
of people might help us better make sense of poverty and high-
light the virtues of moving away from our narrow income- and
wealth-based measures toward something like Sen's concep-
tion of poverty as the lack of freedom. In comparative welfare
state analyses, a similar idea of independence, as measured by
the extent to which it permits citizens to survive apart from
the labor market ("decommodification") or their ability to es-
tablish autonomous households ("defamililization"), has been
a useful heuristic (Esping-Andersen, 1990; O'Connor, Orloff,
& Shaver, 1999). But decommodification fails to account for
the fact that poor people historically have not sought to be
independent of the labor market; and defamilialization el-
evates autonomy to the status of virtue, and leaves out those
who choose dependence, who do not wish to be entirely self-
sufficient, and who expect to live as part of a family or as a
community. Sen's standard of freedom might thus be a better
measure than Esping-Andersen's now standard focus on
dependence/independence.
Whatever the relative merits of redefining poverty along any
of the lines described above, or according to other approaches,
there are profound impediments to change. A shift to any new
poverty measure, even those that have been sanctioned by the
Census Bureau, like the NAS-based alternatives, would have
implications for some 82 federal programs (Blank, 2008). And
any new measure that overcame the failure of current tools to
account for geographic variation across states would have to
contend with bitter legislative battles as those whose constitu-
ents would stand to lose fought to maintain the status quo.
The possibility for positive change is further limited by the fact
that, unlike most other formal, national statistics, control of the
poverty line rests in the Executive Branch, within the Office
of Management and Budget. Given that virtually any change
in the official measure would increase poverty in an instant,
and have massive implications on all programs that used it to
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calculate eligibility for and the generosity of government aid
programs, it would be the rare President indeed who would be
willing to adjust the measure (Blank 2008; Glennerster, 2002).
Indeed, the political pressure is likely to push in the oppo-
site direction, and in 2006 the Bush Administration's Census
Bureau appeared to have abandoned the NAS measures, pub-
lishing only an alternative that better calculated income, but
took no realistic account of expenses, having the effect of re-
ducing the poverty rate without any of the complicated and
expensive measures necessary to reduce poverty itself.
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